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CONSCIENCE, SYMPATHY, AND LOVE: ETHICAL STRATEGIES TOWARD CONFIRMATION OF METAPHYSICAL ASSERTIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER

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The problem generally with "intuitively certain" or "self-evident" truths is that they often are *not* certain or self-evident to any but their author. Hence, intuitive knowledge has frequently been attacked on epistemological grounds as not certain, and in many cases, as not constituting knowledge. In the forthcoming pages it will be shown how Schopenhauer's proof that the world is will rests on just such an intuitive base. As such, his proofs are not entirely satisfying. But Schopenhauer himself admits that explanation by its very nature must reach a point beyond which it cannot go; that all explanation leaves something unexplained; that all accounts of the world leave unexplained a *qualitas occulta*. This does not, however, change the fact that his argument in support of the assertion that the world is will remains somewhat dissatisfying. The acceptance or rejection of Schopenhauer's philosophy ultimately rests on the acceptance or rejection of this, his (not entirely satisfying) explanation of explanation.

However, whereas Book Two of the first volume of *The World as Will and Representation* contains these proofs-that explanation cannot be ultimate and the world is (known in some intuitive way as) will—it is my contention that Schopenhauer, in Book Four, offers yet more support for his metaphysical assertions. I shall seek to illustrate how his writings on conscience, sympathy, and love (contained in his ethical writings) can serve, whether Schopenhauer intended them to do so or not, as additional strategies toward confirmation of his metaphysical assertions in Book Two of *The World as Will and Representation*. Schopenhauer's intention with regard to this matter is, though hardly irrelevant, rather indiscernible. Even so, the textual evidence is such that I would like to think Schopenhauer well aware of the meaning, both from a philosophical and a literary perspective, of the striking interrelatedness of his metaphysical and ethical doctrines, and how one facet of his thought could be easily utilized, if not as proof of the other (for to do so would risk a circle instead of resulting in simple radical interrelatedness), at least in an illustrative, heuristic way suggestive of its credibility.

In the preface to the first edition of *The World as Will and Representation* Schopenhauer states with regard to his great work that: "What is to be imparted by it is a single thought." And the reader immediately wonders what this thought is—a thought that required, in 1818, a large volume (and, we are told, a second reading of that volume) for its proper impartation, and then, in 1844, a second volume of comparable size yet added to that requirement—all for the communication of a single thought. The thought itself is simply stated: *The world is will*. Indeed Schopenhauer repeats this thought again and again. But what, one wonders, is the content of the thought? This of course is what occupies the two volumes of *The World as Will and Representation* and is the foundation for the whole of Schopenhauer's philosophy; it seems one cannot accept Schopenhauer's notion of the world as will without also accepting the rest of his system (at least, that is what he seeks to persuade the reader), and, vice versa, one cannot accept any particular facet of his thought without at the same time accept-

ing the notion of the world as will (this because of the radical interrelation between his metaphysical assertions and all subsequent philosophical elaboration—perhaps a manifestation of any system of thought espousing an idealistic monism). Hence "the world is will" is the root and foundation for Schopenhauer's aesthetic, political, and ethical thought.

But it is here the *content* of "the world is will" must be questioned. What leads Schopenhauer to this notion? And how much credibility or, in current terminology, what sort of validity does his notion have?

Schopenhauer's admiration for Kant is renowned, and it is precisely the problems he found in Kantian philosophy that serve as a departure for his own system. The origins of Schopenhauerean thought lie along a decidedly Kantian line and depict representation and its relation to the principle of sufficient reason as the basis and origin for any inquiry concerned with knowledge. Furthermore, both men felt deeply the desire to *know* the thing-in-itself. But, whereas Kant could not get beyond the representation, whereas in the Kantian system anything underlying or *prompting* representations must lie outside of those representations and hence outside of human comprehension, Schopenhauer felt the need both to *know* those things-in-themselves *and* that it is possible to give an account of *how we do know them*. His philosophy as a whole is such an account.

> We want to know the significance of those representations; to ask whether this world is nothing more than representation. In that case, it would inevitably pass by like an empty dream, or a ghostly vision not worth our consideration. Or we ask whether it is something else, something in addition, and if so what that something is.[1]

Schopenhauer begins his search for significance by considering the body as representation. Surely one has a representation of one's body as existing subject to the principle of sufficient reason?: I can see my body, that is, I perceive my body as existing in space and time and as having a causal relationship with other objects. I have a representation of my body as an object in a world with other objects. But it seems that I am more than a mere body, a mere object—that there is something which differentiates myself from mere representation. Schopenhauer calls this something "will."

> To the subject of knowing, who appears as an individual only through his identity with the body, this body is given in two entirely different ways. It is given in intelligent perception as representation, as an object among objects, liable to the laws of these objects. But it is also given in quite a different way, namely as what is known immediately to everyone, and is denoted by the word *will*.[2]

There is an immediacy when I look for myself that is not present, it would seem, when I regard representations of external objects. The will is this immediacy. As such, Schopenhauer would claim, it is not mediated in any way; space, time, and causality do not shape it as they do representations; it is not itself a representation but, rather, it is the ground of representation, the conditioning possibility of representation. Schopenhauer's appeal to the *individual* and the individual's experience of his own body is well-founded. It *would* seem, at first, that our body has more significance than other representations. Schopenhauer simply terms this special significance will. And because it is unmediated, because it is the *thing* laid bare, it is therefore an *in-itself*: the *thing-in-itself*.

> It is just this double knowledge of our own body which gives us information about the body itself, about its action and movement following on motives, as well as about its suffering through outside impressions, in a word, about what it is, not as representation, but as something over and above this, and hence what it is *in itself*. We do not have such immediate information about the nature, action, and suffering of any other real objects.[3]

From this we can conclude that *my* self is will, and thus that will is the in *in-itself* of myself; that I am immediately aware of the noumenal reality which forms the possibility of my objectification in the phenomenal realm. In this way, *contra* Kant, I am aware of *a* thing-in-itself. But this will,

this thing-in-itself remains singular. It is yet only an *individual* will.

Thus far Schopenhauer has arrived at a very solipsistic position or, as he calls it, a position of theoretical egoism. This position has been distasteful throughout the history of philosophy and is one which Schopenhauer as well seeks to avoid. However, he acknowledges the futility of trying to invalidate such a position through philosophical proofs.

> Theoretical egoism, of course, can never be refuted by proofs, yet in philosophy it has never been positively used otherwise than as a skeptical sophism, i.e., for the sake of appearance. As a serious conviction, on the other hand, it could be found only in a madhouse; as such it would then need not so much a refutation as a cure.[4]

What must occur if we are to avoid solipsism is for the outside material world, and not simply our individual body, to have a degree of inner significance itself so that it is not merely representation and hence *actually exists* (assuming we are allowed to use such vocabulary in reference to an object transcending the Principle of Sufficient Reason) outside of *our* representations, thus making a solipsistic account of self and reality infeasible. By allowing this, by requiring this, Schopenhauer not only claims that I am will, but also the *world* is will.

> If we wish to attribute the greatest known reality to the material world, which immediately exists only in our representation, then we give it that reality which our own body has for each of us, for to each of us this is the most real of things. But if now we analyze the reality of this body and its actions, then, beyond the fact that it is our representation, we find nothing in it but the will; with this even its reality is exhausted. Therefore we can nowhere find another kind of reality to attribute to the material world. *If, therefore, the material world is to be something more than our mere representation, we must say that, besides being the representation, and hence in itself and of its inmost nature, it is what we find immediately in ourselves as will.*[5]

It must be emphasized that this inner significance is not a representation and thus is *not* subject to the principle of sufficient reason. It is therefore not rationally knowable but is *immediate* or self-evident in some sense. Though Schopenhauer frequently says that we *know* the will, this use of the term 'know' is quite a different (and elusive) sense from what we normally mean by the term. This "knowledge" is not rational or representational—of that we can be certain from the text. But is it empirical? This is a rather difficult question to answer. He does indeed claim that apprehension of the will is *a posteriori*.[6] But what could it mean to say that I have an experience of something that is aspatial, atemporal, and is not affected in a causal way? This is to use "experience" in a very novel and strange sense. And so, Schopenhauer's use of the term "knowledge" with regard to the will would be, properly speaking, a misstatement (though one which, due to the functioning of language, would be a necessary one were Schopenhauer to properly achieve communication of his point).[7]

Briefly then, Schopenhauer's strategy in rejecting the Kantian ignorance of noumenal reality and subsequent assertion that the world is will runs thus: (1) The world is representation, and hence my body is representation; (2) My body is not merely representation but it seems to have an inner significance—a significance of which I am aware immediately; (3) Solipsism is a position we should avoid; (4) If we are to avoid solipsism then the material world must not merely be (my) representation but, rather, like the body, it must have its own inner significance; (5) This inner significance is will.

Schopenhauer's assertions can be criticized on several counts. First, he seems to have a questionable reading of Kant. Certain passages in the first volume of *The World as Will and Representation* seem to ignore the fact that Kant had offered proofs for, at least, the *existence* of the thing-in-itself precisely in order that a solipsistic position could be avoided. These proofs are contained, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the Transcendental Analytic, specifically within the chapter expounding the Postulates of Empirical Thought as well as in the Paralogisms of

Pure Reason.[8] Briefly, Kant's proof runs thus: (1) I am aware of myself as existing in time; (2) Time is a function of how we come to have representations; (3) Time determinations are possible only relative to something stable or permanent *outside* of those time determinations; (4) Something in-itself *exists* outside of the time determined representation of myself that forms the basis—the *possibility*—for me to *have* such a time determination. I see no reason why Schopenhauer could not have cited these proofs to his own benefit. Their conspicuous absence from his discussion may lead the reader to wonder whether he understood Kant as, in some sense, maintaining a position of theoretical egoism.

A second major criticism is that there is no reason to suppose the inner significance of the material world is the same as the inner significance we find in ourselves. Insofar as we must attribute to the material world an "inner significance" to avoid solipsism, it is *similar* to what we find in ourselves. But the inner significance of the material world *could* be different from our own. It could have its own distinctive significance utterly alien from our inner significance. Supposedly, Schopenhauer demands the inner significance of the world and of ourselves be the same to avoid solipsism, but he offers no proof for this claim. It is, as he says, an assumption.

However, Schopenhauer has conceded that, not only can a *reason not* be given for the fact that the inner significance of the world is the same as the inner significance of our body, but that we cannot give a reason or make a *rationally valid* knowledge claim with regard to how we "know" our own inner significance in the first place. In the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation* he makes this explicit.

> . . . I have stressed that other truth that we are not merely the *knowing subject*, but that *we ourselves* are also among those realities or entities we require to know, that *we ourselves are the thing-in-itself*. Consequently a way *from within* stands open to us to that real nature of things to which we cannot penetrate *from without*.[9]

The mystery of this inner way, this elusive epistemology (if that is the correct term) is the crux of the problem with Schopenhauer's assertion that the world is will. We want to be able to validate (or invalidate) his claim—a claim, that he claims, is so immediate, so given to experience as to be untouchable by logical/rational/philosophical inquiry (or mediations). It is upon the acceptance or non-acceptance of this fundamental insight, this single thought, that the whole of Schopenhauer's system stands, or falls.

Schopenhauer's "proofs" that the world is will are, on his own admission, not entirely satisfying. However, in the fourth book of volume one of *The World as Will and Representation* it is my contention that Schopenhauer offers additional proof that the world is will through his discussion of lived states or what may be referred to as existential realizations of the world as will. In Book Two Schopenhauer founded his argument on an intuitive base. In Book Four he offers *experiences* which serve as realizations of the world as will. These experiences are conscience, sympathy, and love. It is also interesting to note, considering our adoption of terminology, e.g., "existential," that Schopenhauer mentions the notion of *dread* in a passage that is directly relevant to our discussion. It is with this brief mention that we shall begin, since it serves as a prelude to the other three.

In Section 63, Schopenhauer defines eternal justice as that which "rules not the State but the world." It is not retributive justice, as in the justice of the State, but rather, it is the justice of existence itself.[9] It is in this context, that of eternal justice, that Schopenhauer notes that a state of *dread (Grausen)* exists in the world or, at least, that it is part of the human condition.

When the form of knowledge is called into question, when the *Principium Individuationis* is felt to be undermined in some way, when one is led to question phenomenal existence itself, dread arises. Schopenhauer likens Man's clinging to the Principle of Sufficient Reason to the clinging of a boatman to his boat in the boundless sea.

Just as the boatman sits in his small boat, trusting his frail craft in the stormy sea that is boundless in every direction, rising and falling with the howling, mountainous waves, so in the midst of a world full of suffering and misery the individual man calmly sits, supported by and trusting the *principium Individuationis*, or the way in which the individual knows things as phenomenon.[11]

On occasion, Man wonders at the futility of his knowledge. This confusion, this estrangement from the Principle of Sufficient reason is dread.

From this presentiment arises that ineradicable *dread*, common to all human beings (and possibly even to the more intelligent animals), which suddenly seizes them, when by any other of its forms seems to undergo an exception. For example, when it appears that some change has occurred without a cause, or a deceased person exists again; or when in any other way past or the future is present, or the instant is near. The fearful terror at anything of this kind is based on the fact that they suddenly become puzzled over the forms of knowledge of the phenomenon which alone hold their own individuality separate from the rest of the world. This separation, however, lies only in the phenomenon and not in the thing-in-itself.[12]

Dread *is* confusion over phenomenal, individual existence. Dread is a realization of futility—the futility of the individual in the face of the whole. The object of dread is the thing-in-itself, and the thing-in-itself is beyond all objectivity. This seeming contradiction, that the object of dread is not an object in the normal sense since it transcends all objectivity, is what distinguishes dread from mere confusion or fear. The object of dread cannot be discussed, analyzed, or in any way rationally explicated. It is the thing-in-itself. Hence it can be said that dread is a sudden insight, a realization of the thing-in-itself—of the will.

The relationship which holds between dread and its "object," is analogous to that which holds between conscience and what *prompts* conscience. It is with conscience, and later with sympathy and love, that Schopenhauer offers a practical or ethical proof for the existence of an underlying will. Schopenhauer claims that, from a moral standpoint, if we consider what a guilty conscience or the "sting of conscience" (*Gewissensangst) is*, we will find that it is the feeling brought about or the result of performing an evil act. This is a rather commonsensical observation. What is interesting about Schopenhauer's claim regarding conscience is the reason *why* it arises. Why does one often feel guilty after causing harm to another? Why is there a guilty conscience at all?

Schopenhauer claims that the guilty conscience is a realization that the world is will. It is an insight, on the part of the morally evil agent, that his actions increase the suffering of another and in some way increase his own suffering as well; his conscience makes him suffer. In this way the *Principium Individuationis* is bridged resulting in a grasp of the world as will. The evil man feels himself harmed in some way by his own actions. This feeling is a recognition that, on some level, he and his victim are one.

He has a presentiment that, however much time and space separate him from other individuals and the innumerable miseries they suffer, indeed suffer through him; however much time and space present these as quite foreign to him, yet in themselves and apart from the representations and its forms, it is the one will-to-live appearing in them all which, failing to recognize itself here, turns its weapons against itself, and, by seeking increased well-being in one of its phenomena, imposes the greatest suffering on another. He dimly sees that he, the bad person, is precisely this whole will; that in consequence he is not only the tormentor but also the tormented, from whose suffering he is separated and kept free only by a delusive dream, whose form is space and time.[13]

Schopenhauer presents the pangs of conscience as an immediate awareness of the world as will, the thing-in-itself. But he also presents the good conscience in the same light.

The opposite of the sting of conscience . . . is the *good conscience*, the satisfaction we feel after every disinterested deed. It springs from

the fact that such a deed, as arising from the direct recognition of our own inner being-in-itself in the phenomenon of another, again affords us the verification of this knowledge, of the knowledge that our true self exists not only in our own person, in this particular phenomenon, but in everything that lives.[14]

Thus Schopenhauer presents both the good and the guilty conscience as somehow verifying his claim that the world is will. Exactly *how* this verification is achieved remains problematic. Again, Schopenhauer would say that such knowledge is immediately given or intuitively certain. What is important here, however, is not *how* "the world is will" is verified, but that Schopenhauer claims, through the conscience, *it is* verified. Schopenhauer offers no innovation here with regard to what he had previously offered as *proof* that the world is will in Book Two. What is innovative about his writings on conscience is that he points to a *specific experience* which he claims is proof that we can know or directly apprehend the nature of the thing-in-itself. Further in Book Four, Schopenhauer points to two other experiences that serve as verification of his metaphysical assertion as well. These two experiences are sympathy and love.

At the end of Section 66 Schopenhauer states: "All love is compassion or sympathy."[15] Section 67 then serves as clarification of what Schopenhauer means by sympathy (*Mitleid*). Given the great degree of internal coherence and consistency of his work it is not surprising that sympathy is the acknowledgement of others' suffering based on the recognition of our *own* suffering and the likeness of the two; we feel sympathetic for another because we recognize that person's suffering as analogous to our own.

Schopenhauer further states that this sympathy *is* love.

> Whatever goodness, affection, and magnanimity do for others is always only an alleviation of their sufferings; and consequently what can move them to good deeds and to works of affection is always only *knowledge of the suffering of others*, directly intelligible from one's own suffering, and put on a level therewith. It follows from this, however, that pure affection (*caritas*) is of its nature sympathy or compassion. The suffering alleviated by it, to which every unsatisfied desire belongs, may be great or small. We shall therefore have no hesitation in saying that the mere concept is as unfruitful for genuine virtue as it is for genuine art; that all true and pure affection is sympathy or compassion, and all love that is not sympathy is selfishness.[16]

The objection may be raised that Schopenhauer has been inconsistent. Whereas he previously stated that "all love is compassion or sympathy," in the passage just cited he seems to say that there is a type of love that is *not* sympathetic—a love that is purely selfish. Whereas sympathetic love is based on our knowledge of others' suffering, selfish love—love of or for one's self—is based solely on knowledge of personal suffering. But such love remains sympathetic; it is sympathetic to personal suffering. It is sympathy with one's self and one's own situation; it is of course, possible to feel pity for one's self. This, however, may be stretching the meaning of sympathy too far. There are other grounds though for rejecting Schopenhauer's seeming inconsistency. What has not yet been pointed out is that Schopenhauer has been presenting different aspects of the same thing.

Throughout his discussion of sympathy Schopenhauer tries to maintain two separate stances, two perspectives on the matter. First he presents knowledge of *others'* suffering as primary, then knowledge of *personal* suffering as primary. But, Schopenhauer will argue, such individual perspectives depend on fragmentation of a larger more comprehensive perspective. This larger perspective is suffering in general—not necessarily the suffering of others, or personal suffering, but *suffering itself*.

Sympathy and love, and conscience, and dread for that matter, are all experiences governed by the *Principium Individuationis*; they are events in the phenomenal world. But they are human events or emotions that, so Schopenhauer maintains, somehow lead beyond themselves. This transcendence, is what Schopenhauer claims is the intuitive apprehen-

sion of the world as will. And such apprehension is not governed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Hence it is impossible to adequately discern what the ground of such experience is, for it lies beyond all objectivity. Such a ground, however, is a necessary *condition* for these experiences.

That this interpretation of Schopenhauer's thought is sound, that these human experiences are intimately connected with the will, and that Schopenhauer would want moral experience to serve as further evidence in favor of his assertion that the world is will—these are later confirmed in a few passages of his essay "On Ethics" in Volume Two of *The World as will and Representation*. With regard to the intimate connection between morality and metaphysics Schopenhauer states:

> Moral investigations are incomparably more important than physical, and in general than all other; this follows from the fact that they almost immediately concern the thing-in-itself, namely that phenomenon of it which, directly discovered by the light of knowledge, it reveals its true nature as *will*.[17]

Again, Schopenhauer does not offer an explanation of what constitutes this revelation but only that, in the moral realm, such a revelation does indeed occur. Schopenhauer later explicitly states that sympathy is a key experience in the recognition of the world as will. He does this in a negative way, reminiscent of Kant, by showing that the will as thing-in-itself is a *condition* for the sympathetic experience.

> On this metaphysical identity of the will as thing-in-itself rest in general three phenomena, in spite of the infinite multiplicity of its appearances, and these three can be brought under the common concept of *sympathy*: (1) *sympathy or compassion*, which is, as I have shown, the basis of justice and philanthropy, *caritas*; (2) *sexual love*, with capricious selection, *amor*, which is the life of the species, asserting its precedence over that of individuals; (3) *magic*, to which also belong animal magnetism and sympathetic cures. Accordingly, *sympathy* is to be defined as the empirical appearance of the will's metaphysical identity, through the physical multiplicity of its phenomena.[18]

It is in this passage that Schopenhauer most closely comes to presenting a human experience as proof for his assertion that the world is will. It must be noted here that Schopenhauer's conception of conscience also easily fits into such a proof. It will be remembered that conscience, for Schopenhauer, was the result of an immediate realization that all is one, that the human realm is not so sharply divided into atomistic units called "persons" as it would, *prima facie*, seem to be. Conscience is a sympathetic notion as well; the person with a guilty conscience feels sympathy for the suffering of his victim. Likewise the person with a good conscience realizes that his acts were prompted or were in sympathy with the well-being of others.

Dread, on the other hand, is not so easily subsumed under the general heading of sympathy as conscience and love are. This is due to the fact that, whereas the sympathetic experience retains a somewhat higher degree of the *Principium Individuationis*, i.e., the true relationship between the moral agent and other living creatures is realized while the moral agent remains an individual, on the other hand in a *dreadful* situation the moral agent's individuality completely dissolves. Dread is thus a far more radical, violent, and shocking experience than sympathy. But I think it can clearly be seen how both experiences serve to support Schopenhauer's claim in some way that the world is will.

The objection might, quite rightly, be raised that I experience myself as will just as much as when I experience, say, sympathy—that the experience of myself somehow "gives" the will whereas the sympathetic experience presupposes it. This is undoubtedly true within Schopenhauer's system. But the problem for Schopenhauer, and the specific point I have been trying to make, is that if he is going to claim some sort of intuitive immediacy as the ground of his assertion that the world is will, and if he is going to attempt an *account* of that immediacy, then he is going to need a very powerful heuristic device to convince those skeptics who fail to "see" the substance of his claim. What has been brought out and em-

phasized in the preceding pages is precisely the way that Schopenhauer, rather ingeniously to my mind, uses emotional or moral states, e.g., dread, conscience, sympathy, love, as compelling psychical heuristic devices to lead us to an immediate intuitive realization of all he means by "the world is will"—that through these states we can somehow begin to "see" what he means and that once we thus begin to empathize we can "throw away the ladder" so to speak and attain a non-rational, non-representational insight that the world is will.

In short and more generally, my purpose has been, not to depict Schopenhauer as a precursor to the existentialist philosophers of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (although what I have said, as well as his well-known influence on Nietzsche, will attest to his importance to that movement), but rather to show how his assertion that the world is will has slightly more credibility if it is understood with regard to, not merely his intuitive claims in Book Two, but his presentation and explication of existentially significant lived states in Book Four. With these states in mind his claim would seem to be, if not vindicated, at least more substantial, more worthy of serious consideration by those who would dismiss it as a claim based solely on highly questionable intuitive grounds.

FOOTNOTES

1. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), I, pp. 98-99. Hereafter cited as *WWR*.

2. *WWR*, I,p. 100. This is a most profound observation on Schopenhauer's part. Late nineteenth/early twentieth century neurologists, in fact, coined the term 'proprioception' to refer to this sense of immediate "givenness" of one's body. They go so far as to refer to it as a sixth sense. Their ground for such a claim is that there have been cases when persons have actually *lost* this sense of identity with their body; the body is only experienced *as representation*, as an object among other objects in the world. In such cases, one's body seems wholly disconnected from the sense of self, and thus one feels to be, in a very real and frightening sense, disembodied. For an interesting and readable case history of this see "The Disembodied Lady" in Oliver Sacks, *The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1987).

This scientific evidence poses serious difficulties especially for Schopenhauer's project since his system is so dependent on the double experience of one's body (as representation and as "will"). And though it is unclear what Schopenhauer's response might be, he perhaps would change his position such that, instead of experiencing *the body* in two distinct ways, we experience our *self* in two distinct ways: as a body (representation) and as an immediate object (will). (Though my body is not identical with my self it surely is part of it, and, I submit, vice versa with regard to mind. I think Schopenhauer would agree with this though such a statement is difficult to attribute to a monistic idealist since the mind/body distinction must, for them, ultimately be false.) The problem with this position, however, is that the person lacking proprioception does not feel his body to be part of his self; it is merely a piece of flesh that is somehow always present. The difficulty for Schopenhauer here is intriguing, and current discoveries in neurology provide, at once, impetus for a reconsideration of Schopenhauer as well as what seems *prima facie* a devastating critique of his position.

3. *WWR*, I, p. 103.
4. *WWR*, I, p. 104.
5. *WWR*, I, p. 105, emphasis mine.
6. *WWR*, II, p. 196.
7. Again, this seems to be a problem accompanying any monistic idealism when philosophical distinctions arise; if "all is one," how then should we speak of distinctions? Rather, how do we account for distinction in the world or, indeed, within our account of that world? Schopenhauer would undoubtedly retort, with the Hindus, that distinction is ultimately illusion or *maya*. But when offering a philosophical *account* to ground such claims he must use a distinctive vocabulary to communicate his (substantivally distinct) point. It is here, with the distinctions that language brings (to what may or may not essentially be one), that he falls into trouble.
8. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 344-352.
9. *WWR*, I, p. 332.
10. *WWR*, I, pp. 350-351.
11. *WWR*, I, pp. 352-353.
12. *WWR*, I, p. 353.
13. *WWR*, I, p. 365.
14. *WWR*, I, p. 373.
15. *WWR*, I, p. 374.
16. *WWR*, I, pp. 375-376.
17. *WWR*, II, p. 589.
18. *WWR*, II, pp. 601-602.